the Middle East. Similarly, the Cypriot students would be likely to suspect US motives in foreign policies, particularly in regard to reaching an agreement on the Cyprus problem.
In general, given the conservative trend in Turkish politics in recent years, one would expect that Turkish students vvould demostrate attitudes more supportive of the military and the state and, thus, less liberal in their vievvs than the Cypriot students. The historical legacy of British rule in Cyprus vvould tend to strengthen individualistic values över against strong support for the state and the military.
In any modern nation-state, individuals are enmeshed in the milieu of political rdgimes (Chomsky, 1988 (Chomsky, , 1989 (Chomsky, , 1992 . These may operate to make the individual immune to seeing events and situations in a logical vvay. Students from the Eastern Mediterranean might be able to see problems that U.S. students, innoculated from objective reality by their ovvn media and ideological milieu, vvould not perceive. By the same token, US students may, thinking logically, perceive events in the Eastern Mediterranean more logically than local residents in their ovvn countries. We vvill attempt to observe for these effects in the fındings.
Sample:
The sample consisted of 44 students at a state university in Louisiana, USA (37 vvhite, 7 black; 43 American, 1 Lebanese; 13 male, 31 female) and 88 students at an university in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (65 Turkish, 23 Turkish Cypriot; 65 male, 23 female). The study vvas conducted in March and April of 1993, shortly after US President Clinton took office.
Attitudes Toward President Clinton:
Obviously the American students had access to a much larger volume of information on this issue than students in North Cyprus. Nevertheless, presidential elections tend to be covered vvidely in the national presses around the vvorld, as vvell as on local television nevvs.
It vvould be expected that the Louisiana students vvould not be favorable to the election of President Clinton. On the other hand, given the state of the US economy during 1992, a number of students, especially blacks, vvould likely see the nevv administration as a change for the better.
Many Turkish students vvould likely be favorable to the continuation of the Bush Administration but it is likely that a signifıcant number vvould vveleome a change of leadership. Hovvever, President Bush had long played a role in the global arena and had an international image, vvhile President Also independent of their nationalities, a majority of the students agreed that the US and the vvorld needed a change of leadership (73 % of the Americans, 68 % of the Cypriots, and 61 % of the Turkish students. X 2 =5.08, df = 4, p< .05). There is a statistically signifıcant difference among the students that it is desirable to have a younger US president. The Cypriot students vvere the most favorable vvith 75 % in favor. The Turkish students agreed by a small margin (51 %), vvhile only 46 % of the American students believed that it is desirable (X 2 = 16.25, df = 4, p< .05).
The students again differed signifıcantly on the question of vvhether President Clinton's election wil! be good for the US (X 2 = 18.63, df = 4, p<.05). Most of the Cypriot students (70 %) and 53 % of the Turkish ones believed that Clinton's election vvill be good for the US. On the other hand, only 25 % of the American students thought that it vvill be good for the US. Here, the conservative trend among the Louisiana students is likely reflected.
Independently of their nationalities, there was great skepticism among the students that President Clinton's election vvill be good for the vvorld (X 2 =8.11, df = 4, p< .05). Only 15 % of the Turkish, 26 % of the Cypriot, and 14 % of the American students believed that this is true. Perhaps this reflects former President Bush's generally positive image as a global leader both in Turkey and the US, especially after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and after the Gulf War. Clinton, coming from a part of the US that lacks high visibility, had yet to develop an international profile. Nationality of the respondents also deiermined students' vievvs about vvhether or not President Clinton's election vvill be good for the Middle East For the Americans, 43 % believed that Clinton's election vvill be good for the region, vvhereas only 22 % of the Turkish and 28 % of the Cypriots thought that it vvould be good (X 2 = 9.55, df = 4, p< .05). On the other hand, a large proportion of each group of students (45 %) had no idea. Some comments from students reflected this skepticism. One Cypriot student commented that Clinton's policy vvould be "almost the same as that of George Bush and others." On US policy tovvard Iraq, another Cypriot student commented that "old people and nevvbom children are dying." A Turkish student commented that "if the US policy is good for Iraq, vvhy don't they make [a similar policy] for Bosnia?" Here students were making logical inferences that US students would not be likely to make, given the treatment of these issues by the US media and domestic propaganda apparatus (Chomsky, 1988 (Chomsky, , 1989 . Nationality of the respondents also determined their views about whether or not Clinton's election will be good for Turkey. For the Americans, 37 % thought that Clinton's election would be good for Turkey, while 28 % of the Cypriot students believed so. Only 7 % of the Turkish students believed that Clinton's election would be good for Turkey (X 2 = 30.70, df = 4, p< .05).
Nationality of the students also determined their beliefs as to vvhether or not Clinton's election vvill be good for North Cyprus (X 2 = 30.85, df = 4, p< .05). Only 2 % of the American and 5 % of the Turkish students thought that Clinton's election vvill be good for North Cyprus. on the other hand, Cypriot students vvere more optimistic, vvith 23 % of them saying that Clinton's election vvili be good for North Cyprus. The Cyprus issue vvas very obscure to the American students, vvith 66 % stating they did not knovv. The Cyprus issue, on the other hand, is more familiar to the Turkish and Cypriot students.
The reasons behind this rejection follovv the general suspicion of the US and the UN on the issue, as the debate is carried out in the Turkish press. It is perhaps, signifıcant, however, that the Turkish Cypriots vvere more favorable to Clinton's possible positive influence on the process than the Turkish students. Nationality of the students also determined their expectations as to vvhether or not Clinton's election vvill be good for them (X 2 = 10.98, df = 4, p< .05), vvith 32 % of the Americans, 17 % of the Cypriot and fınally 9 % of the Turkish students thinking that it vvould be.
Attitudes Tovvard the United States:
This group of questions vvas meant to explore the perceptions and orientations of the students tovvard the leadership role of the United States in the global arena in general and in the Middle East, Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean in particular. The US students, especially from the South, vvould be expected to be largely favorable to a greater US role in global politics. The Turkish and Cypriot students, on the other hand, vvould likely have a large degree of reservation, and perhaps opposition to the increased role of the US as the "vvorld's policeman" and sole superpovver in the Nevv World Order. This vvould be particularly true to the extent that they regarded the role of the great povvers as imperialistic.
In terms of Bosnia, the US students may not know a great deal about the situation, but should have been exposed to a good deal of news coverage of the events there över the months prior to this study. It is likely that this issue looms considerably larger for the Turkish and Cypriot students for a number of reasons. The issue has been covered extensively in the Turkish media, the prevailing perspective being that there are underlying religious communaiist sentiments on the part of the West. Since the Serbs are Christian, the West has done nothing to intervene and help the Bosnian Moslems. The late President Turgut özal and other Turkish politicians called for the intervention of Western nations to help the Moslems. Thus, communaiist sentiments have entered here. This perception has fed suspicions about US and European foreign policy in the region, along with the perceived lack of action by the UN to stop the Serbian advances. This lack of action has been juxtaposed against the massive invasion of US forces in the Gulf vvar to save Kuvvait, and obviously treated vvith rich cynicism (and justification) in the Turkish press. This had been the tone in the Turkish press for the previous months. Thus, the West, the US, and the UN had most of its credibility in Turkey on its policy in this area. Added factors are the possibility of the conflict spreading to Turkey, and the assisiance being sent to the Moslems by some governments in the region.
An added dimension, about the time of the survey, vvas the concern in Turkey över the advances on predominantly Müslim Azerbaijan by Armenians in Nagorno -Karabakh, and calls in Turkey to help the Moslems there. While there are sentiments for the Moslems and a perception of communal discrimination by Christian nations, Turks are also very concerned at this time about threats of Islamic fundamentalist forces to the secularist values of Kemal ism.
In terms of the role of the US in the vvorld, vve see a very striking contrast based on the nationality of the students (X 2 = 52, df = 4, p< .05). While 100 % of the Cypriot and 91 % of the Turkish students believe that its role in the vvorld today is too great, only 32 % of the American students agreed vvith this. One Cypriot student remarked that the US is an "old vvoman afraid of others and uses guns."
There vvas also a statistically significant difference betvveen the nationality of students vvho believe that the US should intervene in Bosnia to help the Moslems (X 2 = 54, df = 4, p< .50). Almost ali of the Turkish (91 %) and the Cypriot (93 %) students believed that the US should intervene in Bosnia, vvhile only 30 % of the American students agreed vvith them. It is interesting that vvhile the Turkish and Cypriot students see the US as too interventionist, on the question of Bosnia, they contradictorily vvant the US to intervene. This reflects the perception of the US as hypocritical in the Turkish press. As one Turkish student put it: "If they go to Iraq, they have to go to Bosnia?" On the question of intervention in Bosnia, another Turkish student commented: "Of course."
Turkish and Cypriot students ovenvhelmingly saw the US as an imperialist nation, while the Americans did not (X 2 = 35, df = 4, p< .50). In the case of the Turkish students, 66 % believed that the US is an imperialistic nation, while 65 % of the Cypriots thought so. However, only 14 % of the American students thought that the US is imperialistic. It should be noted, hovvover, that 52 % said they did not know whether it is an imperialistic nation or not. Some of the uncertainty is likely caused by not understanding the meaning of the term "imperialist." The Turkish and Cypriot students may have heard someone refer to the US as imperialist. Students from the American South, on the other hand, would see the US in a better light.
American students also rejected the notion that the US dominates smaller nations too much (36 % agreed), while the Turkish and Cypriot students ovenvhelmingly agreed (86 %). Also American students approved that the US is the world's sole superpower, while the Turkish and Cypriot students did not. Fifty-eight % of the Turkish and 65 % of the Cypriot students are not happy with the reality that the US is the vvorld's only superpower now. Even though 34 % of the American students are not happy vvith it, we cannot say that the difference betvveen the percentages is statistically significant (X 2 = 8.44, df = 4, p< .05).
On vvhether the US is fair in its dealings vvith other nations, the US students thought so, overvvhelmingly, vvhile the Turkish and Cypriot students rejected the notion (X 2 = 26, df = 4, p< .05). Only a small group of Turkish (29 %) and Cypriot (16 %) students believed that the US is fair, vvhile 66 % of the American students saw the US as fair.
The American students did not knovv vvhether the US dealt fairly vvith Turkey (91 %). The Turkish and Cypriot students, hovvever, thought the US did not deal fairly vvith Turkey (48 %). Similarly, 91 % of the American students did not knovv about US dealings in Cyprus, vvhile the Turkish and Cypriot students (63 %) savv the US dealings vvith Cyprus as unfair.
Attitudes Toward the United Nations:
The third section deals vvith perceptions tovvard the United Nations. While the image of the United Nations has never been very positive among conservatives in the American South, it is possibly seen as more favorable by them after its recent role in the Gulf vvar. On the other hand, the UN had very little credibility in Turkey and North Cyprus at the time of the survey, primarily as a result of the ongoing vvar in Bosnia and the perception of its role in Cyprus. The Ghali Plan (Set of Ideas) for the reunification of Cyprus under a federated state plus the predominantly negative perception of BoutrosGhali as the UN Secretary General were relevant factors. Behind this was the perception (and communalist prejudice), played out in the regional press that Boutros-Ghali, owing to the fact that he is a Coptic Christian married to a woman of Italian-Jewish descent (Meiser, 1992) , is thus more likely to be favorable to Greece in any plan for settlement of the Cyprus problem. Much of this was exacerbated by the "rejectionist camp," who oppose any solution and tend to favor the status quo situation.
Nevertheless, 64 % of the American students, 54 % of the Turkish and 44 % of the Cypriots saw the role of the UN in solving global problems as positive. On the question of whether the UN policy tovvard the Middle East is fair, 55 % of the American students agreed, while only 27 % of the Turkish and 29 % of the Cypriot students agreed. Student perceptions of UN faimess in dealing with Iraq followed the same pattem.
On the issue of UN policy tovvard Cyprus, student attitudes vvere dependent upon nationality (X 2 = 49.44, df = 4, p< .05). While 84 % of the American students believed that UN policy tovvard dealing with the Cyprus problem was fair, only 31 % of the Turkish and 16 % of the Cypriot students agreed vvith them.
The American students (89 %) stated that they did not knovv vvhether Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was a good person to head the UN, vvhile the Turkish and Cypriot students, not surprisingly, overvvhelmingly (73 %) rejected his leadership. Again this reflects the suspicions toward SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali as seen in the Turkish and Cypriot presses.
In addition to Bosnia, another issue that has harmed the image of the UN in Turkey and Cyprus had been that of the exiled Palestinians in southern Lebanon since December 1992. The lack of action on this issue, in contrast to the UN role in the 1991 Gulf War, has been seen as yet another instance of hypocrisy. One Turkish student made the comment that UN policy "is fair for Israel but not for Palestinians." Most American students (55 %) said they did not knovv if UN policy tovvard Israel and the Palestinians was fair, vvhile 55 % of the Turkish and 58 % of the Cypriot students said it vvas not.
Turkey has traditionally had good relations vvith Israel and vvas the first Müslim nation to establish diplomatic relations vvith Israel (Rostovv, 1987) . So, the issue of injustice to Moslems emerges.
Attitudes Tovvard Secularism:
Secularist policies are firmly established planks of public policy in both the United States and Turkey (Kinross, 1981) . The First Amendment to the US Constitution states that Congress shall make no lavv respecting an establishment of religion. This has been interpreted by the US Supreme Court through various decisions to mean that it is unconstitutional for the US Government to spend tax monies to promote religion. In the United States, secularism has been taken to mean virtual total separation of the state and religion.
Secularism in Turkey, on the other hand, has meant state domination of religion and at times the enforcement of secularism. The roots of this policy go back to the Tanzimat period of reform in the nineteenth century during Ottoman rule. Efforts to restore the Ottoman state led to efforts to vveaken the ulema. Atatürk, vvhile using the religious establishment to accomplish his efforts to create the modern Turkish state, abolished the Caliphate. Thus, state guidance of religion is deeply rooted in history and tradition. In practice, the role of the state in religious affairs in Turkey vvould violate both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Congress cannot spend money to promote religion, nor "prohibit the free exercise thereof." In Turkey, there is a state-run Religious Affairs Directorate to carry out tasks connected vvith the "beliefs, divine services and the moral principles of islam and to enlighten the people on religion." In March, 1993, this organization vvas launching a "majör project to interpret the Koran for better understanding by [a] younger generation of Turks." There is a supreme board vvithin this directorate that can issue religious orders or fatvvas. A concem of the director, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz, vvas to take legal action against religious personnel involved in politics. The vievv of pro-Islamic groups in Turkey is that the Religious Affairs Directorate represses religion (Gökalp, 1993) .
Since the assassination of Uğur Mumcu, a prominent journalist and vvriter in Ankara by a car bomb in January 1993, the grovving alarm among urban elites that Islamic fundamentalism is grovving stronger in Turkey has been prominent in the Turkish press. The press vvas instrumental in the effort to pin the blame for the assassination on Iran. There has, by the same token, been grovving dread at the increasing strength of the pro-religious party (Refah Partisi) in the large cities, particularly istanbul. Consequently, the issue of secularism had been on the public mind, particularly urban elites, since the events in January.
The late President Turgut özal vvas also instrumental in accommodating the religious right by allovving certain concessions such as mosques on college campuses, vvhile he vvas in office. Earlier, mosques vvere allovved to again give the cali to prayer in Arabic.
This set of questions shovvs, as one vvould expect, that the Turkish and Cypriot students see religion as having a negative effect on politics, vvhile the American students are more positive that religion could have a desirable effect on politics. On the question of vvhether it is acceptable to use religious beliefs as a basis for political offıce, 43 % of the American students thought so, while only 18 % of the Turkish and Cypriot students agreed. This result likely reflects the resurgence of fundamentalist Christianity in the United States in the 1980s. The South is a part of the American bible belt. Two other factors are salient. First, a larger proportion of students attend private religious schools in the American South as a result of the attempt by the US courts to enforce integration of the races since the 1960s. Secondly, there were well publicized attempts to introduce the teaching of so-called "creation science" into the public schools in Louisiana. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled this to be the teaching of religion and thus a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The faction of the US religious right, led by Operation Rescue founder Randall Terry, has called for the United States to become a "Christian Republic." In a speech in San Jose, California, on July 14, 1993, Randall said the US Government was "too secular" and that the US must become a Christian nation guided by the Ten Commandments (Abortion Militancy, 1993).
On vvhether the government should protect the state from religious extremism, both groups of students agreed that it should. The American students are vvilling to see religion in politics, but also to use the state to control vvhat they see as "extremism."
As expected, most of the American students rejected the use of public tax money to support religion (73 %). The Turkish and Cypriot students agreed (58 %). Unlike the US, hovvever, in Turkey, tax money is used for religious instruction and to guide islam. In fact, the share of tax money of the Directorate of Religious Affairs from the general budget has dramatically increased in recent years from 59.4 billion Turkish liras in 1986 to 950.8 billion in 1990 (Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1991, 577) . The 27 % of the American students vvho desired going against the First Amendment prohibition on using tax money to support religion reflects both support for religion in the American South and the general trend tovvard conservatism of youth in recent years.
Again, both groups agreed that the state and religion should be completely separate. The Turkish and Cypriot students vvere, hovvever, much more fırm on this issue (82 %) than the American students (55 %), but by a much larger margin for the Turkish students. On the other hand, the US practice much more nearly accords vvith the secularist ideal.
Attitudes Tovvard Terrorism:
It vvas expected that both groups of students vvould agree that terrorism is a legitimate concern of modem governments and that strong governmental measures to combat such activity is justified. When asked vvhether Iran is a terrorist nation, independent of their nationalities, a majority of the students agreed that Iran is a terrorist nation (X 2 = 7.14, df = 4, p< .05). Agreement vvas strongest among the Americans (77 %), vvhile 68 % of the Turkish and 55 % of the Cypriot students agreed. The Turkish and Cypriot students both agreed that Iran is trying to destroy democracy by spreading Islamic fundamentalism (75 % of the Turkish and 87 % of the Cypriots). The Americans vvere uncertain about this as 59 % said they did not knovv, vvhile 27 % agreed. The media in both countries has presented an image of Iran as a terrorist nation.
A high percentage of the students (81 % of the Turkish, 84 % of the Cypriot, and 93 % of the Americans) agreed that the government should use as much force as necessary to deal vvith terrorists. There is no significant difference among the nationalities (X 2 = 6.15, df = 4, p< 05).
Attitudes Tovvard the Military:
While conscription for the military forces ended in the US in the 1960s, military service is stili manditory in Turkey and is largely supported by the public. One vvould expect stronger support for required military service in Turkey. On the other hand, the perspective of students in a conservative state like Louisiana vvould likely be more pro-military than in other sections of the US outside the South.
Turkish (82 %) and Cypriot (70 %) students strongly agreed that the military should stay out of politics. The perspective of Atatürk vvas that military should leave politics to the civilian sphere. While the Turkish military has entered the political arena three times since the 1950s, it has done so only as a temporary measure under the rationale of restoring order and making possible the continued movement tovvard a democratic state. Fifty % of the Americans said the military should stay out of politics.
Further, the American students strongly rejected the proposition that everyone should be required to serve in the military, only 7 % in favor. Clearly, vvhile quite a number of students from the South emer the military voluntarily, they definitely vvant to be able to make a choice. The Turkish and Cypriot students, on the other hand, supported required universal military service by 57 % and 47 % respectively. Both groups of students strongly supported the freedom for vvomen to serve in the military. Ninety-one % of the Americans, 75 % of the Turkish, and 87 % of the Cypriots agreed military service should be open to vvomen. Hovvever, vvhen one breaks dovvn these numbers by sex, it is significant that the strongest opposition to vvomen in the military came from Turkish males. Tvventy-three percent of Turkish males vvere opposed to vvomen serving in the military. On the other hand, of the 30 Turkish and Cypriot women in the study, only 2 opposed military service for women. The breakdown by sex was not available for the Americans.
Both groups of students vvere opposed to allovving homosexuals to serve in the military. Sixty-six % of the Turkish, 43 % of the Cypriot, and 52 % of the Americans rejected admission of gays into the armed sevices. Again, 72 % of the Turkish males opposed this proposition, shovving the strongest bias.
Ali groups of students believed that men make better soldiers than vvomen, independent of nationality (X 2 = 9.12, df = 4, p< .05). More than half (56 %) of the Turkish students agreed that men make better soldiers than vvomen. For Cypriot and American students, the proportions agreeing vvere 37 % and 59 % respectively. This result more than likely reflects the tradition in both countries of objectifying the fighting soldier as a man, (associated vvith povver, missiles, bullets, conquests, ete.) and it is certainly presented this vvay in both countries. If one looks at the Turkish and Cypriot vvomen, hovvever, it is seen that only 30 % of this group agreed that men make better soldiers. Apparently, Turkish and Cypriot vvomen are ready to fight.
The sharpest difference in this section is seen in the desire to serve in the military, vvith the Turkish and Cypriot students saying they vvould like to serve (34 % and 17 % respectively), vvhile only 18 % of the American students vvanted to serve. The military in the US tends to dravv in a disproportionate share of lovver socioeconomic groups, and minorities, vvho have trouble fınding jobs elsewhere (Bartling and Eisenman, 1992) . Further, the image of the military in the US has stili not recovered from the Vietnam era, in spite of (probably partly because of) Operation Desert Storm.
Attitudes Tovvard the VVest:
Democracy carries very positive values in Turkey, as the population vvants to believe that Turkey is becoming more democratic. The unleashing of capitalism from extensive state control through greater liberalization of the economy and privatization has been promoted by the late President Turgut özal and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. It is not clear, hovvever, hovv deep support for such radical economic liberalization runs among the general population. One might expect a critical vievv tovvard such reform among many college age youth. One might also expect Turkish students to hold their more Western-oriented values as superior to those of Arabs. Arabs do not have a highly positive image in the Turkish press. This is mostly due to the strong support of the sharp break made by Atatürk from traditional Islamist values and the reform of Turkish society tovvard the values of Europe. While one vvould expect strong support for "modern" values, there might also be fairly strong support for "traditional" values.
On vvhether or not democracy is the best form of government, not surprisingly, independent of their nationalities, students believed that democracy is the best form of government (X 2 = 7.53, df = 4, p< .05). Seventy percent of the Turkish, 80 % of the Cypriot, and 68 % of the American students agreed.
When asked vvhether "vvestern-style" democracy vvas best for their countries, 68 % of the Americans, 46 % of the Turkish, and 45 % of the Cypriot students agreed. Results vvere very similar on the question of vvhether US-style democracy vvas a good model for other countries (68 % of Americans and 47 % of Turkish students agreeing), except for the Cypriots in vvhich only 19 % thought the US vvas a good model.
Only 11 % of the American students said that Western values are superior to Arab and oriental values, although 55 % said they did not knovv. For the Turkish and Cypriot students, 40 % and 53 % respectively said Western values are superior. A stronger pro-Western bias among the Turkish and Cypriot students is seen vvhen they vvere asked vvhether their country is more like Europe than Asia. While only 57 % of the Americans thought so, 82 % of the Turkish and 69 % of the Cypriots said their country vvas more European than Asian. One student, quite rightly, remarked that it depended upon vvhether one means vvestern Turkey or eastern Turkey. It is quite likely that the high percentage of Turkish students identifying vvith European culture reflects not only historical links, but a strong strain in Kemalism and the desire of most in Turkey to have closer economic and trade relations vvith the West.
There are statistically significant differences among the proportion of students who think that their countries are democratic (X 2 = 22.67, df = 4, p< .05). Almost ali of the American students (82 %) thought that the US is a democratic country. On the other hand, only 52 % of the Turkish, and 42 % of the Cypriot students believed that their country is democratic. The skepticism among the Cypriot students might reflect the recent controversies över allegations of political corruption in the North Cyprus Government along with political disputes betvveen Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu and President Rauf Denktaş.
The proposition that "my country has the best democracy in the vvorld" evoked İaughter among at least one Turkish Cypriot student. There is a statistically significant difference betvveen the students vvith respect to this statement (X 2 = 36.84, df = 4, p< .05). While most of the Turkish (82 %) and Cypriot students (81 %) did not think that their countries had the best democracies in the vvorld, only 27 % of the Americans said their country's democracy was not the best. Among the rest, 48 % of the Americans thought the US had the best democracy, while 25 % did not have any idea about it.
When asked about capitalism as the best form of economy, 41 % of the American students said it vvas best, vvhile 50 % of the Turkish and 13 % of the Cypriots agreed. The relatively higher proportion of Turkish students desiring capitalism might be related to the background of many students in the university vvhere the question vvas asked and also the influence of Turkish politicians like the late Turgut özal.
It is also interesting that American students vvere more favorable to traditional values than the Turkish and Cypriot students. Not having a knovvledge of modern Turkey, most Americans vvould likely think of Turkey as stili "traditional." On the other hand, "modernism" is an important aspect of Kemalism. It is likely, then, that the concept of "tradition" has more positive connotations in the American South than in Turkey. When asked vvhether traditional values are better than modern values, 45 % of the Americans, but only 18 % of the Turkish, and 10 % of the Cypriot students said traditional values vvere better. When one breaks dovvn the figures by sex, hovvever, it is seen that of the 9 Turkish vvomen, none vvas favorable to traditional values, vvhile 22 % of the Turkish men liked traditional Turkish values.
Attitudes Tovvard Patriotism and Nationalism:
On the values of patriotism and nationalism, one vvould expect largely similar results across national boundaries. Not surprisingly, ali three groups of students demonstrated effective processes of political socialization by agreeing strongly that one should "love their country" (93 % for the Americans, 89 % for the Turkish, and 87 % for the Cypriots). A large percentage of the Americans thought their country vvas the best place to live (80 %), vvhile 65 % of the Turkish and 35 % of the Cypriots thought so. Sixty-six % of the Americans, 25 % of the Turkish, and 19 % of the Cypriot students said their country vvas the greatest country. Americans also thought their country vvas the "most free" (82 %), vvhile 11 % of the Turkish and 19 % of the Cypriots said their country vvas most free.
The proportion of students desiring to live abroad vvas highest among the Cypriot students (39 %) vvhile 27 % of the American and 24 % of the Turkish students said they vvould like to live abroad.
The question on vvhether one's country should be more religious is perhaps more important, given the increasing concern about the role of religion in politics. Students from the American South, vvho go to private religious primary and secondary schools in large numbers, vvould be expected to see a positive role for religion in the US. Turkish students, on the other hand, would be expected to reject the proposition that their country should be more religious. On this question, there are statistically significant differences among the views of students (X 2 = 53.65, df = 4, p< .50). In this respect, American students are more conservative (52 %) than the Cypriot (10 %) and the Turkish (19 %) students. On the other hand, it shows that the Turkish state has been succesful in inculcating the secularist values of Kemalism into a generation of students, vvhich is in turn, used to preserve the povver and ideological hegemony of the state. This is important as the government and elites are apprehensive about the grovving strength of religious groups and political parties. This questionnaire vvas given shortly after huge crovvds had marched in the streets of ali of Turkey's majör cities in support of secularism, after the assassination of journalist Uğur Mumcu.
Attitudes Tovvard Race and Ethnicity:
Since the Civil Rights Movement, beginning in the 1950s in the US, the US Government has sought to promote equality and civil rights for blacks in the US and integration in public facilities. On the other hand, this is a time when "ethnic cleansing" is reshaping vvhat vvas once Yugoslavia, and fears abound that this sort of ethnic holocaust vvill be repeated elsevvhere. While attempts are ongoing to find a way to reunite Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the two communities have lived separately for almost 20 years.
While vvhites and blacks, for the most part, live in separate areas of tovvns and cities in the American South, and the society remains essentially racist, Americans even in this area have come to acknovvledge the justice of racial equality and that it is not acceptable to express racits sentiments in public. Support for former Klansman David Duke, on the other hand, and lifestyles, shovvs that vvhen it comes to personal lifestyles, white and black societies are largely separated.
One vvould not except the American students to knovv about the Kurdish issue. Turkish students may belive that the Kurds are also Turks (Ghassamlou, 1965 ). Atatiirk's perspective, in accord vvith modern nationalism, vvas that ali vvho lived vvithin Turkey's borders vvere Turkish citizens. One vvould not expect to find significant support for a Kurdish state in the area now part of Turkey. Turkey has vvaged a vvide war against "Kurdish terrorism" in recent months in southeastern Anatolia and Northern Iraq. One vvould also expect students vvho like David Duke to say that blacks should have their own state if they vvere consistent in their reasoning. Hovvever, individuals may hold to abstract principles of justice in their minds, vvhile denying the principle to groups in their own country because of prejudice or state propaganda.
American students overvvhelmingly agreed (98 %) that ali races and ethnic groups should be treated equally, vvhile 91 % of the Turkish and 87 % of the Cypriot students agreed. When asked if blacks and whites should live together in the same areas, 78 % of the Americans, 98 % of the Turkish, and 97 % of the Cypriot students agreed. So, there are statistically significant differences among the students as to vvhether blacks and vvhites should live together (X 2 = 16.55, df = 4, p< .50).
But vvhen asked vvhether Greeks and Turks should live together, one sees vvider differences. While 59 % of the Americans and 50 % of the Turkish students agreed, only 26 % of the Cypriot students agreed. So, there are statistically significant differences among the proportions of the students on this question (X 2 = 37.61, df = 4, p< .05). It is interesting that vvhile 83 % of the Cypriots agreed that blacks and vvhites should live together, only 26 % of them thought that Greeks and Turks should live together. Turkish Cypriot students often state that Greek and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together. This is likely due to a number of factors, among them, the history of ethnic conflict on the island before 1974, their parents' experiences, frequent demonstrations by Greek youth in the south seen on television, and the perception of the problem in the Turksh Cypriot press. On the other hand, they see no reason vvhy blacks and vvhites should not live together.
Thirty percent of the Americans, the same percentage of Turkish, and 17 % of the Cypriot students said that nationality should be based on race and ethnic group. Why do Turkish Cypriot students living in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, vvhich is essentially based on ethnic group, reject so strongly the notion of nationality based on ethnic group? If asked, most Northern Cypriots vvould likely say it is better if the North remains separated from the south. Perhaps they did not understand the meaning of ethnic nationalism or do not see the contradiction.
The vievvs on the question on Kurdish nationalism is also interesting. When asked if the Kurds should be free to have their ovvn country, 36 % of the Americans, 21 % of the Turkish, and 48 % of the Cypriot students agreed. Here vve see that the percentage, as vvould be expected, is lowest among the Turkish students. When asked, on the other hand, if blacks should be free to have their ovvn country, 43 % of the American, 37 % of the Turkish, and 51 % of the Cypriot students agreed.
On the issue of Kurdistan, one Turkish male student commented: "Kurds and blacks are not [the] same people. Everybody vvants [their] ovvn countries, but if they deserve this country. I think Kurds aren't deserve for Türkiye" [sic] . A second Turkish male vvrote that Kurds can have their ovvn country "if they can fınd a place." Another Turkish male said they should be free to have their ovvn country, "but not in our country."
Attıtudes Tovvard Relative Well-Being:
Finally, the last section dealt vvith the question of progress in terms of vvell-being över time. While the students from Turkey and North Cyprus clearly and strongly felt that people vvere better off than ten years ago (81 % and 68 % respectively), only 39 % of the American students said they vvere better off. Hovvever, 59 % of the American students felt that their individual parents had made progress. This is consistent vvith recent data on the US economy. More people have become poorer. Since 1978, the proportion of households falling belovv the poverty line has grovvn by 26.4 %. Among families vvith children, it has grovvn by 38.3. This is partly because the gains in income have largely gone to the rich. More than half of the additional income generated betvveen 1977 and 1989 vvent to the top one percent of America's households (Hocker, 1993) .
Fifty-nine percent of the American students thought that their individual parents had made progress, vvhile 75 % of the Turkish and 61 % of the Cypriot students thought that their parents had made progress. Perhaps in the American case, the parents of the students in coiiege are better off financially than most persons in the community. On the other hand, the Turkish economy has been grovving much faster than the American economy in the past decade, and elites have disproportionally benefited from this.
While 31 % of the American students thought that most countries in the vvorld vvere not better off than ten years ago, the proportions vvere 57 % for the Turkish and 52 % for the Cypriot students. Perhaps this reflects the general trends in their respective countries.
Summary and Discussion:
The US students vvere not favorable tovvard President Clinton's election and tended to see the results as less favorable for their country and themselves than for the rest of the vvorld. They also supported a strong leadership role for the US in the vvorld and for the most part believed that the US deals fairly vvith other nations. The US students vvere the most favorable to the UN's role in global affairs. They tended to see the role of religion in politics as positive. Like other students, they savv terrorism as a threat and supported strong use of government force to suppress it. The US students, vvhile clearly conservative, tended to vievv the military less favorably than did the other groups of students. Not suprisingly, the US students tended to believe that the US has the best democracy and looked positively on "traditional values." In principle, the US students supported racial and ethnic equality, but vvere less supportive in practice. Reflecting economic difficulties in the last two decades, the US students tended to believe the economic well-being of their families had suffered in recent years.
The results, as indicated by the high percentage of "Don't Know" responses on some items, also reflected the fact that the US students were not vvell informed on issues of common interest to students in Turkey and North Cyprus. For example, 66 % of the US students had no idea whether President Clinton's election vvould be good for Cyprus, 52 % had no opinion on vvhether the US is imperialistic, 91 % did not knovv if the US deals fairly vvith Turkey and Cyprus, 59 % had no opinion on vvhether Iran vvas attempting to spread Islamic fundamentalism, and 89 % gave no opinion as to vvhether Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali is a good person to lead the UN. Nevertheless, a meaningful pattern for comparison emerges.
While the Turkish students vvere more favorable to President Clinton's election, they did not see it as favorable for their country and area of the vvorld. Turkish students tended to be cynical about US foreign policy motives and believed that these policies vvere unlikely to change signifıcantly vvith the takeover of the nevv administration in Washington. Although the students vvere Western in their outlook, they overvvhelmingly vievved the US as exerting too much povver över smaller countries. It is somevvhat contradictory, then, that they supported US action to help the Muslims in Bosnia. After the massive intervention in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, US inaction in Bosnia vvas vievved as hypocritical. The Turkish students, unlike the US students, vvere highly distrustful of the United Nations, especially in regard to policies in Cyprus and Bosnia.
Turkish students clearly savv the influence of religion on politics as negative, reflecting the Kemalist tradition and current concern in Turkey that religious fundamentalism is on the rise. The Turkish students agreed vvith the Americans on the need to contain terrorism and tended to see the military as more positive. The Turkish students vvere somevvhat more suspicious of the impact of vvomen and homosexuals on the military than the Americans. While the Turkish students demonstraıed a strong preference for democracy, they thought Turkey did not measure up to their ideals. They also shovved a strong preference for modern rather than traditional values. Like the Americans, the Turkish students agreed to the principle of racial and ethnic equality, but a significant number doubted vvhether Greeks and Turks should live together. The Turkish students strongly rejected a separate state for the Kurds. Finally, the Turkish students felt their families had made significant economic gains in recent years, perhaps reflecting the faster rate of grovvth of the Turkish economy.
The Cypriot students, like the Turkish, believed that President Clinton's election vvould be good for the US bul not for them nor the region vvhere they live. Cypriot students also agreed vvith the Turkish that the US exerts too much povver över smaller nations. Not surprisingly, the Cypriots largely rejected the UN role in solving regional problems. Their perception of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was particularly negative. They also rejected the role of religion in politics. The Cypriots had a more positive view of the military than the Americans, but not as positive as that of the Turks. The Cypriots also saw their country as falling far short of their democratic ideals. Like the other groups of students, vvhile accepting the ideal of ethnic equality, Cypriot students strongly rejected the idea that Turkish and Greek Cypriots should live together.
Chomsky's vievv that ideology and state/media propaganda prevents logical thinking on issues of public policy can be observed in the responses of US students to at least two items. While generally favorable to US policy in the Middle East, vvith the massive US intervention in the 1991 Gulf War, the Americans did not support intervention to help the Bosnian Muslims. The Turkish and Cypriot students vvere able to see much more clearly the biases in US foreign policy in favoring protection for Kuvvait but not for Bosnia, and in favoring Israeli interests över those of the Palestinians. Also, the US students did not see the US as dominating the vvorld or smaller nations too much, vvhile US dominance vvas obvious to the other groups of students. On the other hand, the Turkish and Cypriot students tended to contradict themselves in calling for an assertion of US povver in Bosnia.
That the Turkish students' vievvs vvere also rendered illogical by state propaganda can be seen in their responses to the question of a Kurdish state. While they demonstrate strong nationalism as Turks, they deny that same right to the Kurds, reflecting the historical policy of Turkey on the issue. The Cypriots also demonstrated how their minds have been shaped by propaganda on the Cyprus issue. Wnile they believe in ethnic equality and that nationality should not be based on ethnicity, they believe that Turkish and Greek Cypriots cannot live together.
This study has explored the attitudes of three groups of students on several contemporary issues, cross-nationally. There is not much documentation on the attitudes of students in North Cyprus, to vvhich this study seeks to contribute. Turkey presents an interesting case as it does not fit neatly into the stereotypes of areas of the vvorld that Americans tend to demonstrate. While situated in the Middle East, its citizens tend to be Westernized and profoundly shaped by the Kemalist values of modernism and secularism. Moreover, most Americans are not very avvare of Turkey, perhaps partly because of the above. As such, it presents an interesting case for comparison. It is instructive that students in Turkey demonstrated values and orientations significantly more modern, secular, and progressive, on a number of contemporary issues, than did students at a university in the US.
